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Tribal Court Jurisdiction in Dissolution-
Based Custody Proceedings
Lesley M. Wexlert
With the rise of non-Indian1 populations on reservations2 and
movement of families on and off reservations,3 courts must in-
creasingly resolve jurisdictional disputes between states and
tribes.4 Over 70 percent of American Indians marry outside of
their tribes, to either members of another tribe or members of
another race.5 As a result, more than 50 percent of Indian chil-
dren have a non-Indian parent.' When these mixed relationships
t B.A. 1998, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 2002, University of Chicago.
1 This Comment uses the term "Indian" to refer to a person who is either a member
of or eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe. This term refers to the rele-
vant legally-defined category of people but is not meant to convey a normative judgment
about their legal status, nor does it properly describe the ethnic background of Native
Americans. See B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a Federal Forum to
Vindicate the Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the Vagaries of State Courts,
73 ND L Rev 395, 395 n 2 (1997) (explaining the terms "Indians" and "Native Americans").
2 See Department of the Interior, Statistical Abstracts: American Indian, Eskimo,
Aleut Population, available online at <http://www.doi.gov/nrl/StatAbstUTribalPop.pdf>
(visited Apr 4, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (showing that in 1990, 46 percent of
residents on highly populated reservation and trust lands were neither American Indians,
Eskimos, nor Aleuts).
3 See U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Indian Heritage Month, available online
at <http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/1999/cb99ff14.html> (last modified Oct 21,
1999) [on file with U Chi Legal F] ("In 1997, about one-quarter of the nation's American
Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut households had moved during the preceding year.").
4 See generally Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction over Matters
Arising in Indian Country: A Roadmap for Improving Interaction Among Tribal, State and
Federal Government, 31 McGeorge L Rev 973, 976 (2000) (making a related point that
"because the tribal, federal and state systems exist in a world of mass communication and
transportation, the number of controversies... that cross borders will only increase").
r See U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population and Housing, Table 2, Race of Cou-
ples (1990), available online at <http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/race/
interractab2.txt> (visited Dec 12, 2001) [on file with the U Chi Legal F] (stating that al-
most 75 percent of marriages involving Indians are interracial).
6 See U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population and Housing, Table 4, Race of Child
by Race of Householder and of Spouse or Partner (1990), available online at <http://www.
census.gov/population/socdemo/race/interractab4.txt> (visited Mar 31, 2001) [on file with
the U Chi Legal F] (showing that 54 percent of Indian children have a parent of a different
race).
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fail,7 parents may contest jurisdiction over the custody proceed-
ings that follow.
Child custody battles between divorced or separated parents,
known as "dissolution-based"' proceedings, present a thorny ju-
risdictional issue. Battles over jurisdiction prolong custody dis-
putes while state and tribal courts engage in lengthy and fact-
intensive inquiries as to which court should hear the case. Delay-
ing resolution of the placement and visitation arrangements
hurts children, who often face uncertain and contested living ar-
rangements in the interim.9 Furthermore, precluding tribal adju-
dication of child custody proceedings may threaten the well-being
of the child and the longevity of the tribe. If state courts favor
non-reservation or non-Indian placement, then children and
tribes risk losing vital contacts with each other.
For example, the recent case of In re Marriage of Skillen'°
presented a complex intersection of reservation" residence and
tribal membership. Both the mother and child lived on a reserva-
tion, while the father resided off the reservation. 2 Both the
mother and child were enrolled members of the Fort Peck Tribe;
the father was a non-Indian. 3 The ensuing custody battle real-
7 See Indian Health Service Steering Committee, et al, The State of Native American
Youth Health, available online at <http://www.cyfc.umn.edu/Diversity/nativeamer.html>
(visited Mar 31, 2001) [on file with the U Chi Legal F] ("Native teenagers live in a variety
of family constellations; less than half of study participants live with two parents."). The
total Indian population approaches two million. See U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Popu-
lation, "Characteristics of American Indians by Tribe and Language," Table 2, Selected
Social and Economic Characteristics for the 25 Largest American Indian Populations
(1990), available online at <http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/race/indian/
ailang2.txt> (visited Dec 13, 2001) [on file with the U Chi Legal Fl. Thus, the number of
potential custody disputes is quite high.
8 This Comment will treat divorcing parents and separating parents who were never
married as equivalent. They both engage in "dissolution-based" custody proceedings. See
John v Baker, 982 P2d 738, 747 (Alaska 1999) (contending that courts should treat sepa-
ration and divorce as equivalents under the Indian Child Welfare Act).
9 See Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA") § 1, 9(IA) Uniform Laws
Annotated ("ULA") 271 (1999):
The general purposes of this Act are to ... (1) avoid jurisdictional compe-
tition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of child custody
which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from State to
State with harmful effects on their well-being; . . .(4) discourage continu-
ing controversies over child custody in the interest of greater stability of
home environment and of secure family relationships for the child.
10 956 P2d 1 (Mont 1998).
11 For the purposes of this Comment, "reservation" and "Indian country" will be used
interchangeably.
12 See Skillen, 956 P2d at 4-5.
13 See id at 4.
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ized the possibilities of delay and confusion inherent in jurisdic-
tional disputes. The father obtained joint custody in a state dis-
trict court proceeding that established him as the primary resi-
dential custodian. 4 Seeking a custody order from the Fort Peck
Tribal Court, the mother also petitioned to dismiss the district
court's enforcement of the original custody order for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 5 Other cases present similarly complex
combinations of membership and residence.
Unlike most child custody cases involving Indians, no explicit
federal legislation governs dissolution-based proceedings. In-
stead, judges must decide whether uniform state jurisdictional
statutes govern, or whether those statutes are trumped by sover-
eignty principles enshrined in Supreme Court doctrine and the
Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA").'6 Judges must also address
whether dissolution-based custody proceedings involving either
non-tribal members or tribal members domiciled or residing 7
outside of Indian country fall within the internal affairs of the
tribe. Courts need a consistent approach to help answer these
questions in a way that responds to both state and Indian inter-
ests.
Part I of this Comment discusses the principles and limita-
tions of Indian sovereignty and the non-infringement doctrine.
Part II demonstrates why uniform child custody jurisdiction stat-
utes are inadequate to properly assign jurisdiction in dissolution-
based custody disputes. It also deals with the struggle of whether
to assign exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction in these cases. Part
III of this Comment explores the ICWA to explain the harms that
result from both jurisdictional uncertainty and the potential bi-
ases of state courts in making jurisdictional and placement deci-
sions.
Finally, in Part IV, this Comment sets up a comprehensive
framework for determining when tribal courts ought to exercise
jurisdiction over dissolution-based child custody proceedings.
Tribal jurisdiction should be exclusive if: (1) all relevant parties
are enrolled tribal members residing or domiciled in Indian coun-
try; or (2) the child and at least one parent are enrolled tribal
members, and the child is residing or domiciled in Indian coun-
14 Id at 5.
1 Id.
16 Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-608, 92 Stat 3069, codified at 25
USC §§ 1901-63 (1994).
17 While domicile and residence are distinct concepts, some courts in child custody
cases view either one as sufficient to establish jurisdiction in a particular court.
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try. On the other hand, tribal and state jurisdiction should be
concurrent when the child and at least one parent are enrolled
tribal members, but the child is not residing or domiciled in In-
dian country. Here, state courts should use comity-based defer-
ence advocated by Indian law scholar Barbara Atwood" which
weighs relevant factors including the child's personal relationship
with each of the parents, the child's assimilation into tribal life,
and the parent's ties to the tribe and length of residence on and
off the reservation."9 Finally, state jurisdiction should be exclu-
sive if: (1) the tribe has been divested of its inherent sovereignty;
or (2) the tribal code precludes exercise of jurisdiction.
I. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE NON-INFRINGEMENT DOCTRINE
In order to understand the current problems courts face in
adjudicating child custody disputes involving Indian children,
some background in basic principles of Indian sovereignty is nec-
essary. The sovereignty principles articulated by the Supreme
Court were eventually refined into the non-infringement doctrine,
which courts should use to guide child custody cases.
A. Basic Principles of Sovereignty: A "Geography-
Plus" Approach
According to noted Indian law scholar Felix Cohen, three ba-
sic principles underlie most judicial decisions on the source and
nature of Indian tribal powers.2 ° First, Indian tribes possess the
18 See Barbara Ann Atwood, Fighting Over Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses of
Jurisdictional Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L Rev 1051, 1099-1107 (1989) (presenting guidelines
for resolving jurisdictional disputes).
19 This flexible, fact-based inquiry was developed in Application of Bertelson, 617 P2d
121 (Mont 1980). When balancing state and tribal interests in a custody dispute where a
child lived with her grandparents on a reservation and the mother lived off the reserva-
tion, the court decided that:
The trial court should also inquire into the following factual and legal
matters which may affect a determination of which is the better forum to
ascertain the best interest of the child: the existence of tribal law or
tribal customs relating to child care and custody in cases of this sort; the
nature of the child's personal relationship with her grandparents and
with her mother; the child's assimilation into and adjustment to life in
the tribe and on the reservation; the mother's ethnic and cultural back-
ground and membership in or ties to the Chippewa Cree Tribe or any
other tribe; the length of the child's residence both on and off the reserva-
tion; the domicile and residence of the child's father and the child's per-
sonal relationship with her father.
Id at 130.
20 Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 123 (Dept of Interior 1941).
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powers of sovereign states.2 Second, tribes are subject to the leg-
islative power of the United States.22 While the creation of the
United States clearly terminated the external powers of Indian
sovereignty, like the ability to conduct treaties with foreign na-
tions, neither conquest nor the Congress divested the Indians of
their internal powers of sovereignty.23 Internal powers include
determining tribal membership,24 regulating domestic relations
among tribe members,2 and prescribing inheritance rules.26 Fi-
nally, while treaties or express congressional legislation may
qualify or divest these internal powers, absent such action, "full
powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and
their duly constituted organs of government."27
The Supreme Court explicitly upheld these fundamental
principles of Indian sovereignty in The Cherokee Cases: Cherokee
Nation v Georgia" and Worcester v Georgia.29 In Cherokee Nation,
Chief Justice Marshall recognized the sovereignty of Indian
tribes, stating that the Cherokee were "a distinct political society
... capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself"3"
and had an "unquestioned right to the lands they occupy." 1 Here,
Justice Marshall linked sovereignty with geography, acknowledg-
ing the importance of land to self-government.2 Worcester further
developed this relationship when the Court struck down state
statutes that prohibited Cherokees from enacting laws and con-
demned tribal courts as unconstitutional.33 In so doing, the
21 Id. See Worcester v Georgia, 31 US (6 Peters) 515, 559-60 (1832) (noting that the
tribes are not "wholly distinct nations within whose boundaries the laws of [a state] can
have no force"). See also New Mexico v Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 US 324, 331 (1983)
(citation and internal quotation omitted).
22 Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law at 123 (cited in note 20) ("Conquest ren-
ders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States.").
23 See id ("Conquest ... does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe,
i.e., its powers of local self-government.").
24 See generally Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 US 76, 95 (1906); Roff v Burney,
168 US 218, 222-23 (1897).
25 See Fisher v District Court, 424 US 382, 387-89 (1976).
26 See Jones v Meehan, 175 US 1, 29-32 (1899); Mackey v Coxe, 59 US 100, 102-04
(1855).
27 Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law at 123 (cited in note 20).
28 30 US (5 Peters) 1 (1831).
29 31 US (6 Peters) 515 (1832).
30 Cherokee Nation, 30 US (5 Peters) at 16.
31 Id at 17.
32 Id.
33 See Worcester, 31 US (6 Peters) at 560 ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct
community, occupying its own territory, with the boundaries accurately described, in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force ... but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.").
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Worcester Court explained that only Congress could abridge tribal
sovereignty,34 and the concurrence emphasized the role of geogra-
phy as sufficient for the exercise of sovereign authority. 5 Subse-
quent decisions drew from these basic concepts in determining
the scope of tribal jurisdiction.36
B. Non-Infringement Doctrine
The non-infringement doctrine, announced in Williams v
Lee,37 drew on the fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty
enshrined in Worcester and Cherokee Nation. The non-
infringement doctrine set up a test to determine when states
have legitimate adjudicatory and regulatory civil authority over
Indian matters: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress,
the question has always been whether the state action infringed
on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them."3 The Williams Court held that a state court could
not assert civil jurisdiction over a case involving a non-Indian
respondent who wanted to collect a debt contracted on an Indian
reservation.39 Williams explicitly recognized that Indian tribes
possess inherent sovereignty that only congressional action can
divest.4" Williams further argued that while tribes generally
maintained inherent tribal sovereignty over civil actions arising
34 See id at 561. ("They interfere forcibly with the relations established between the
United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled
principles of our Constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the Un-
ion."). Thus, the Congress and the federal courts may redefine and restrict tribal sover-
eignty. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 Cal L Rev 1573, 1582 (1996) (expressing the concern
that Worcester allows courts to narrow the scope of tribal sovereignty).
35 See Worcester, 31 US (6 Peters) at 591 (McLean concurring) ("A state claims the
right of sovereignty, commensurate with her territory .... [I]t would violate the solemn
compacts with the Indians, without cause, to dispossess them of rights which they possess
by nature, and have been uniformly acknowledged by the federal government.").
36 See Iowa Mutual Insurance Co v LaPlante, 480 US 9, 20 (1987) (Marshall) (reiterat-
ing the importance to tribal sovereignty of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-
Indians on reservation lands to tribal sovereignty, and reaffirming the pro-Indian back-
ground presumption); National Farmer's Union Insurance Cos v Crow Tribes of Indians,
471 US 845, 855-56 (1985) (confirming that tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians is
part of inherent tribal sovereignty and that divestiture requires congressional action).
"Civil jurisdiction over such activities [of non-Indians on reservation lands] presumptively
lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal
statute." Iowa Mutual Insurance Co, 480 US at 18.
37 358 US 217 (1959).
38 Id at 220.
39 See id at 223 ("It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the
Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place there.").
40 See id at 220.
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on their land, states possessed authority to act on reservation
matters when they did not infringe on that sovereignty.4 In set-
ting up this distinction, the Court reinscribed The Cherokee
Cases's distinction between internal and external affairs.
In assigning jurisdiction over internal affairs, Williams relied
on a geographic notion of sovereignty;42 sovereignty stemmed
from land ownership.43 Unlike criminal jurisdiction, where tribal
membership is determinative," Williams established geography
as a relevant factor for purposes of civil jurisdiction.45 For exam-
ple, the Court specifically applied the non-infringement test to
reservation Indians: "Congress has also acted consistently upon
the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the af-
fairs of Indians on a reservation."46
Furthermore, the Court decisively eliminated membership as
necessary to the exercise of tribal authority.47 The Court noted:
"It is immaterial that the respondent is not an Indian. He was on
the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place
there."48 While explaining that membership was not a necessary
prerequisite to the exercise of tribal jurisdiction,49 the Court did
not clearly eliminate membership as sufficient to establish tribal
jurisdiction. A "geography-plus" reading of Williams and other
Supreme Court cases on sovereignty contends that geography is
sufficient to establish jurisdiction, but the right of tribes to gov-
41 Williams, 358 US at 220 (noting, for example, that state courts may try non-
Indians for committing crimes against each other, even if the relevant actions took place
on reservation land).
42 See Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of
Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U Pitt L Rev 1, 49
(1993) (contending that "Williams employed a geographically-based meaning of 'internal'
and 'external'").
43 See L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millenium, 96
Colum L Rev 809, 823 (1996) ("The Court implicitly acknowledge[d] the inherent rights of
tribes as being largely coextensive with their territory."). See also Dussias, 55 U Pitt L
Rev at 48 (cited in note 42) ("The [Williams] Court treated tribal authority as being
geographically-based.").
44 See Duro v Reina, 495 US 676, 693 (1990) ("[In the criminal sphere membership
marks the bounds of tribal authority.").
45 Williams, 358 US at 219 ("[This Court has modified these principles where essen-
tial tribal relations were not involved ... but the basic policy of Worcester has re-
mained.").
46 Id at 220.
47 Id at 223.
48 Id.
49 Williams, 358 US at 223.
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ern their own internal affairs may extend outside of Indian coun-
try.50
The Supreme Court substantially narrowed the Williams
non-infringement test in a case involving a regulatory matter. In
Montana v United States,51 the Court denied the authority of the
Crow Tribe to regulate the hunting and fishing of non-Indians on
reservation land owned by non-Indians.52 The Court held that,
absent "express congressional authorization," a tribe's power to
exercise its sovereignty over non-Indians only extends to "what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations."53 Thus, Montana reversed the background presump-
tion that tribes possess absolute civil jurisdiction over actions
arising on their lands.54 Changing the background rule decreased
the ability of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Yet, at the same time, the Court confirmed that tribal courts
still hold some inherent sovereign authority over the actions of
non-Indians.55 Montana set up two important exceptions to the
new background rule of state jurisdiction over non-Indian actions
arising on reservations. First, tribes maintain jurisdiction over
non-Indians when a non-Indian enters a consensual commercial
relationship with the tribe.56 Second, tribes may exercise exclu-
sive jurisdiction if a non-Indian's conduct on a reservation
50 While this Comment presumes that the geography-plus interpretation of Supreme
Court rulings dealing with the civil jurisdiction of tribes is accurate, other interpretive
inferences are possible. Many scholars argue that the Court relied instead on views of
sovereignty based solely on geography or membership. For a discussion of these alterna-
tive views, see generally Dussias, 55 U Pitt L Rev at 43-58 (cited in note 42) (concluding
that the Supreme Court, "although providing for initial tribal court determination of tribal
jurisdiction in civil cases, has not itself affirmed the existence of tribal court civil jurisdic-
tion over all cases arising within the boundaries of the reservation, and thus has not ex-
plicitly accepted a wholly geographically-based approach to tribal court civil jurisdiction").
51 450 US 544 (1981).
52 See id at 566-67.
53 Id at 564.
54 See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive to Divest
Tribal Sovereignty, 27 Conn L Rev 1281, 1285 (1995) ("Montana ... shifted the burden
from the state to the tribe to show authorization from Congress, the non-Indians' consent,
or endangerment of the tribe's critical interests in government, economic security, and
social welfare.").
55 See Montana, 450 US at 566 ("A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise
civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.").
56 See id at 565 ("A tribe may regulate ... the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, con-
tracts, leases, or other arrangements."). See also Strate v A-1 Contractors, 520 US 438, 456
(1997) (reiterating that the first exception relating to consensual relationships is explicitly
commercial).
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"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."57
The Court has subsequently construed the "internal affairs"
exception narrowly. In Brendale v Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation,58 Justice White argued that tribal
authority need not extend to all conduct that threatens or affects
the tribe's political integrity or welfare. 9 Instead, "[tihe impact
must be demonstrably serious and must imperil the political in-
tegrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the
tribe." ° Strate v A-1 Contractors61 affirmed this limited construc-
tion; it reiterated that a "tribe's inherent power does not reach
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to
control internal relations."62 More importantly, the Strate Court
failed to distinguish between civil adjudicatory authority and
regulatory authority. Thus, even if the Montana rule once applied
only in regulatory cases, it now seems applicable to tribal civil
jurisdiction over the conduct of non-Indians on Indian lands, even
when such cases involve adjudicatory matters. 3
A geography-plus interpretation of these cases concludes that
Indian tribes possess sovereign adjudicatory authority outside of
Indian country.64 The geography-plus approach stems from the
fundamental principles of Indian law that Indian tribes possess
the powers of a sovereign state and, absent congressional legisla-
tion to limit those powers, tribes maintain all sovereignty not di-
vested by conquest.
57 Montana, 450 US at 566.
58 492 US 408 (1989).
59 See id at 429 (White) (plurality) ("This indicates to us that a tribe's authority need
not extend to all conduct that 'threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe', but instead depends on the
circumstances.").
60 Id at 431 (emphasis added).
61 520 US 438 (1997).
62 Id at 459, citing Montana, 450 US at 564 (brackets and quotation marks omitted).
63 See Aaron S. Duck, Note, Indians: Modern Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Indian
Parties: The Supreme Court Takes Another Bite Out of Tribal Sovereignty in Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 51 Okla L Rev 727, 740 (1998) ("The Supreme Court simply failed to recog-
nize the differences between civil adjudicatory authority and regulatory or legislative
authority.").
64 See Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 US 130, 152, 158 (1982) (holding that the
tribe maintained tax power over village gas transported off the reservation for sale, even if
it did not exercise that power, as long as Congress had not divested it); United States v
Wheeler, 435 US 313, 322 (1978) ("The powers of Indian tribes are, in general, inherent
powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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C. Applying the Non-Infringement Doctrine to Child
Custody Cases
Both case law and tribal testimony confirm that family-
related matters, including child custody, fall within the internal
affairs of the tribes. In Fisher v District Court,5 the Supreme
Court used the non-infringement doctrine to grant exclusive ju-
risdiction to tribal courts over adoption proceedings arising on the
reservation and "involv[ing] only Indians."66 In that instance, the
tribal court found that a resident tribal member had neglected
her child, and consequently awarded the child to another tribal
member.67 The biological mother initiated an adoption proceeding
in a Montana district court. The district court dismissed for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction,69 but the Montana Supreme Court
overturned this dismissal.7" The United States Supreme Court
decided that the action was "litigation arising on the Indian res-
ervation."' 1
In applying the non-infringement test, the Court emphasized
that it was to determine jurisdiction by using a geography-based
notion of sovereignty because the relevant parties resided on the
reservation. 2 The fact that all the litigants were tribal members
only heightened the bar to infringement.73 The Court also made
clear that even though the marriage or the divorce occurred off
the reservation, those events were tangential to proceedings that
determine the permanent status of the litigants.7"
65 424 US 382 (1976).
66 Id at 386, 389 ("Since the adoption proceeding is appropriately characterized as
litigation arising on the Indian reservation, the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court is exclu-
sive.").
67 Id at 383.
68 Id at 383-84.
69 Fisher, 424 US at 384.
70 Id at 385.
71 Id at 389.
72 See id at 389 & n 14.
73 See Fisher, 424 US at 386, quoting Williams, 358 US at 220:
In litigation between Indians and non-Indians arising out of conduct on
an Indian reservation, resolution of conflicts between the jurisdiction of
state and tribal courts has depended, absent a governing Act of Congress,
on "whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians
to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Since this litigation in-
volves only Indians, at least the same standard must be met before the
state courts may exercise jurisdiction.
74 See Fisher, 424 US at 389.
622 [2001:
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While the Court decided Fisher prior to Montana and Strate,
it seems clear that the case falls within Montana's internal af-
fairs exception. As the Fisher Court explained:
State-court jurisdiction plainly would interfere with the
powers of self-government conferred upon the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe and exercised through the Tribal Court. It
would subject a dispute arising on the reservation among
reservation Indians to a forum other than the one they
have established for themselves ... it would create a sub-
stantial risk of conflicting adjudications affecting the cus-
tody of the child and would cause a corresponding decline
in the authority of the Tribal Court.75
Although the case only involved reservation Indians, its emphasis
on self-government and tribal-court authority could extend to
cases where the child resided off the reservation. Although the
tribal interest might be less pronounced in those instances, land
need not define the boundaries of tribal jurisdiction. Instead,
while Fisher supports the contention that land is a prerequisite to
the exclusive exercise of jurisdiction, a geography-plus interpre-
tation still allows membership to establish concurrent jurisdic-
tion.
DeCoteau v District County Court76 furthered the geography-
based interpretation of the non-infringement test. Here, an en-
rolled member of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe contested the ju-
risdictional power of the state court to assign her children, also
members of the tribe, to foster homes.77 All relevant parties
agreed that if the acts took place in Indian country, the state
courts had no jurisdiction.78 This agreement demonstrated the
emerging consensus about the importance of land to the exercise
of Indian sovereignty.
Finally, in John v Baker,79 the Alaska Supreme Court
adopted the geography-plus approach. In that case, the parents
and children lived in Northway Village, an Indian community
that was not part of Indian country, until the time of the parents'
separation. 0 The mother, Ms. John, then moved to Mentsats Vil-
75 Id at 387-88.
76 420 US 425 (1975).
77 Id at 428-29.
78 Id at 427 ("The parties agree that the state courts did not have jurisdiction if these
lands are 'Indian country.').
79 982 P2d 738 (Alaska 1999), cert denied, 2000 US Lexis 1434.
80 Id at 743.
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lage, a different Indian community, and the parents shared cus-
tody of their two children.81 The father, Mr. Baker, filed for sole
custody in the Northway tribal court, and Ms. John consented to
tribal jurisdiction.82 When the tribal court granted shared cus-
tody, Mr. Baker then initiated a separate action in state court.83
The superior court denied Ms. John's motion to dismiss the ac-
tion, eventually granting Mr. Baker primary custody.84
Reversing the Superior Court's decision, the Alaska Supreme
Court held that tribes retain all fundamental aspects of sover-
eignty not specifically divested by Congress. 5 John noted that
Indian sovereignty stems from tribal governance, which predates
the nation's founding.8 Included within these inherent sovereign
powers are "internal functions involving tribal membership and
domestic affairs."87 Thus, in interpreting Montana's internal af-
fairs exception to the non-infringement doctrine, the John major-
ity maintained that land ownership was not a prerequisite to the
protection of tribal self-government and the control of internal
relations.8
Some argue that Williams offers little guidance in determin-
ing jurisdiction, because it does not clarify whether courts deter-
mine infringement on the nature of the civil dispute or on resi-
dence."9 The geography-plus interpretation of Williams employed
in John, however, accounts for the relevance of both factors.
Fisher establishes that residence is necessary for exclusive juris-
diction.9" Given the nature of child custody disputes, the interest
of the tribe in regulating this matter is not vitiated just because
the members have chosen to move off the reservation.9'
Tribes themselves clearly view their power to adjudicate
cases involving children as a vital aspect of sovereignty. The Na-
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See John, 982 P2d at 743.
84 Id at 743-44.
85 Id at 751.
86 Id ("We begin our analysis ... with the established principle under federal law that
'Indian tribes retain those fundamental attributes of sovereignty... which have not been
divested by Congress.... [T]his starting point stems from the fact that tribal governance
predates the founding of our nation."').
87 John, 982 P2d at 751 (citations omitted).
88 See id at 752. See also Montana, 450 US at 564.
89 See Atwood, 36 UCLA L Rev at 1071 (cited in note 18) ("The 'Williams test,' al-
though now routinely applied to determine the propriety of state court jurisdiction over
disputes involving Indians, provides little concrete guidance.").
90 424 US at 389-90 n 14 (concluding that since all relevant parties resided on the
reservation, the adoption arose there and thus, tribal jurisdiction was exclusive).
91 Atwood, 36 UCLA L Rev at 1080 (cited in note 18).
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vajo Supreme Court stated that "[t]here is no resource more vital
to the continued existence and integrity of the Navajo Nation
than our children. Consequently, we have a special duty to en-
sure their protection and well-being."92 Given these factors, the
non-infringement doctrine takes on special force in the child cus-
tody context.
D. Limitations on Sovereignty
The non-infringement doctrine provides a useful framework
with which to evaluate child custody cases, but there are notable
limitations on the internal powers of Indian tribes. Courts and
scholars agree that treaties or express congressional legislation
may qualify or divest the internal powers of a tribe.93 This could
result in exclusive state court jurisdiction over child custody
cases. For instance, in DeCoteau, the Supreme Court established
that the loss of reservation status is an important limitation on
the application of the non-infringement doctrine. DeCoteau held
that state courts had jurisdiction over foster care proceedings on
non-Indian lands within previous reservation borders, even
though all the affected parties were enrolled members of a tribe.94
In this instance, tribes had exercised their power under the Al-
lotment Act95 to sell unalloted lands to non-Indians.96 As the Indi-
ans no longer possessed control over the relevant land, the Court
concluded that they had instituted voluntary divestiture.97
Whether voluntary or involuntary, divestiture renders many po-
tential child custody jurisdictional disputes obsolete.
The scope of divestiture of a tribe's adjudicative authority is
often uncertain. Public Law 53-280 ("PL-280"),95 passed in 1953,
required certain states99 and allowed others °° to assume civil ju-
92 Barbara Ann Atwood, Identity and Assimilation: Changing Definitions of Tribal
Power Over Children, 83 Minn L Rev 927, 941 (1990), citing In re Custody of S.R.T., 18
Indian L Rptr 6158, 6160 (Navajo Sup Ct 1991).
93 See Part I A.
94 See DeCoteau, 420 US at 444-47, 449.
95 Indian General Allotment Act, 24 Stat 388 (1887), codified at 25 USC § 348 (2001).
96 DeCoteau, 420 US at 444-47, 449.
97 See id at 446 ("[B]ecause the tribe and the Government were satisfied that reten-
tion of allotments would provide an adequate fulcrum for tribal affairs ... exclusive tribal
and federal jurisdiction [would be] limited to the retained allotments.").
98 Act of Aug 15, 1953, Pub L No 53-280, ch 505, 67 Stat 588, codified at 18 USC
§ 1162 (2001).
99 These states are California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Act of
Aug 8, 1958, Pub L No 85-615, § 2, 62 Stat 545, codified at 18 USC § 1162 (2001).
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risdiction over affairs arising in Indian country.1"1 PL-280 only
applies to jurisdiction over claims arising in Indian country,
which the statute defines as Indian reservations under federal
jurisdiction, Indian allotments, and dependent Indian communi-
ties.1 12 The plain language of the text makes the geographic limi-
tation clear: "Each of the States ... shall have jurisdiction over
civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are
parties which arise in the areas of Indian country."0 3 Thus, a
court has determined that lands held by Indians but not located
in Indian country, such as land received under the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA"), °4 are outside the scope of PL-
280.105
Disagreement exists as to whether PL-280 grants states ex-
clusive jurisdiction or dictates that they share it if exclusive
tribal jurisdiction previously existed.106 The Supreme Court has
explicitly declined to rule on the matter.10 7 One lower court
viewed the provision as merely granting states concurrent juris-
diction,0 8 while other courts have interpreted PL-280 as a divesti-
ture statute in the area of child custody.10 9 This latter interpreta-
tion gives meaning to a "reassumption clause" in the ICWA which
permits any tribe subject to state jurisdiction under PL-280 to
petition the Secretary of the Interior to reassume jurisdiction
100 Alaska chose to adopt PL-280. Act of Aug 8, 1958, Pub L No 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat
545, codified at 18 USC § 1162 (2001). Montana chose not to adopt PL-280. See Skillen,
956 P2d at 6.
101 See 18 USC § 1162 (2001).
102 See 18 USC § 1151 (1994).
103 28 USC § 1360(a) (1994).
104 43 USC § 1601 (1994).
105 See John, 982 P2d at 748 ("The Supreme Court held ... that a village occupying
ANCSA lands does not qualify for the 'dependent community' definition of Indian coun-
try.... If Northway Village does not occupy Indian country .... then PL-280 has no direct
relevance.").
106 See David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, and Robert A. Williams, Jr., Cases
and Materials on Federal Indian Law 570 (West 3d ed 1993) ("Potential concurrent juris-
diction of the tribal courts under Public Law 280 has not been conclusively litigated.").
107 See Washington v Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation,
439 US 463, 488 n 32 (1979) ("This issue, however, is not within the scope of our order
noting probable jurisdiction .... and we do not decide it here.").
108 See, for example, Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v Alaska, 944 F2d 548, 562
(9th Cir 1991).
109 See, for example, Matter of F.P., 843 P2d 1214, 1215-16 (Alaska 1992) (determining
that PL-280 granted states exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters); Native Vil-
lage of Nenana v State Department of Health & Social Services, 722 P2d 219, 220 (Alaska
1986) (holding that a tribe cannot petition for transfer jurisdiction under the ICWA until
the Secretary of the Interior approved its petition to reassume jurisdiction, because PL-
280 divested the tribe of civil adjudicatory authority).
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over child custody proceedings. 1 ° The implication is that absent a
petition, tribes lack any jurisdiction over child custody proceed-
ings."' On the other hand, interpreting PL-280 as a divestiture
statute leads to the anomalous outcome that state jurisdiction
over reservation land may be exclusive, while tribal courts may
have jurisdiction over certain land outside Indian country.
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to resolve the dis-
agreement about whether PL-280 should be read as a divestiture
statute in the area of child custody disputes. How courts read PL-
280, however, affects the sovereign status of many tribes. If PL-
280 divests tribes of even concurrent jurisdiction, then tribal
courts in Indian country in PL-280 states cannot hear child cus-
tody disputes.
II. RELEVANT UNIFORM JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES AND
THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
To resolve dissolution-based custody disputes over Indian
children, judges often look to existing jurisdictional statutes such
as the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA") and
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act ("PKPA")."' These stat-
utes balance various interests: the best interests of the child; the
importance of residence and domicile; and the need for prompt
resolution of child custody matters. Yet none of these statutes
adequately resolves the jurisdiction for dissolution-based custody
proceedings involving Indian children.
A. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
Scholars drafted the UCCJA"3 to deter parents from forum
shopping by moving their children to new states, and to prevent
relitigation of custody matters."4 All fifty states adopted the
UCCJA,"' which uses four different jurisdictional tests: home
110 See 25 USC § 1918(a) (1994).
111 See F.P., 843 P2d at 1215-16.
112 See, for example, Baker v John, 982 P2d 738 (Mont 1998).
113 9(IA) ULA 270 (1999).
114 See Kelly Gaines Stoner, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement
Act (UCCJEA)-A Metamorphosis of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA), 75 ND L Rev 301, 301 (1999).
115 Uniform Law Commissioners, Introductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts: A Few
Facts About... The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, available
online at <http://www.nccusl/org/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.htm> (vis-
ited Mar 20, 2001) [on file with the U Chi Legal F].
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state, significant connection, emergency, and vacuum.'16 While
the text of the statute fails to clearly prioritize one of these stan-
dards, in practice courts favor granting jurisdiction to the "home
state" of the child."7 The UCCJA defines the "home state" as
"[tihe state in which the child immediately preceding the time
involved lived with his parents, [or] a parent ... for at least 6
consecutive months.""' Thus, the jurisdictional inquiry often fo-
cuses on the residence of the child, to the exclusion of other fac-
tors.
The PKPA11s provides enforcement authority for certain as-
pects of the UCCJA. Like the UCCJA, the PKPA is also designed
to prevent child snatching for the purposes of forum shopping.'20
Additionally, the PKPA attempts to isolate continuing jurisdic-
tion in the court that can more readily determine the best inter-
ests of the child.' 2 ' Unlike the UCCJA, however, an effective pref-
erence for the home state clearly emerges in the text of the
116 UCCJA § 3, 9(IA) ULA 307-08 (1999) (brackets in original):
(a) A court of this State which is competent to decide Child custody mat-
ters has jurisdiction to make a Child custody determination by initial or
modification decree if:
(1) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement
of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within 6 moths be-
fore commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State
because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for
other reasons, and a parent or person acting as his parent continues to live in
this State; or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume ju-
risdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is
available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) the child has been
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because
he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is oth-
erwise neglected for dependent]; or
(4)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under prerequi-
sites substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1),(2), or (3), or another
state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on that ground that this State is
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it
is in the best interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
"17 This preference may have emerged from a comment to the UCCJA. UCCJA § 3
comment, 9(IA) ULA 308 (1999) ("In the first place, a court in the child's home state has
jurisdiction.").
118 UCCJA § 2, 9(IA) ULA 286 (1999).
119 28 USC § 1738A (1994).
120 Act of Dec 28, 1980, Pub L No 96-611, § 7, 94 Stat 3568 (noting that one of the
purposes of the PKPA was to "deter interstate abductions and other unilateral removals of
children undertaken to obtain custody and visitation awards").
121 28 USC § 1738A(c).
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PKPA.'22 The PKPA gives continuing jurisdiction to the court that
originally determines the issue of custody, requiring that other
states give the original determination full faith and credit.123
Thus, states following the UCCJA favor home state jurisdiction,
since the PKPA imposes a duty on sister states to enforce judg-
ments consistent with the UCCJA and PKPA. In effect, the PKPA
grants exclusive jurisdiction to the original court. Thus, the
PKPA helps focus the jurisdictional priorities of the UCCJA to-
ward the home state.
The UCCJA applies to jurisdictional conflicts between states;
the definition of "state" generally includes any state, territory, or
possession of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and the District of Columbia.'24 The UCCJA does not ad-
dress whether tribes should be considered states, and courts have
not reached a consensus on this issue. While some courts have
analogized Indian tribes to "territories" within the meaning of the
UCCJA25 and to "states" within the meaning of the PKPA,'26 oth-
ers have refused to extend these statutes to tribes.'27
Tools of statutory interpretation cut in both directions on this
question. Application of the "expresio unius, exclusio adierus"
maxim would treat all omissions as deliberate exclusions.'28 In
addition, subsequent statutes like the Uniform Child Custody
122 Id.
123 28 USC § 1738A(d):
The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody de-
termination or visitation consistently with the provisions of this section
continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section
continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child of
any contestant.
124 UCCJA § 2(10), 9(IA) ULA 287 (1999).
125 See Martinez v Superior Court, 731 P2d 1244, 1247 (Ariz Ct App 1987) (holding
that in a custody dispute between one Indian parent and one non-Indian parent, Indian
tribes are states within the meaning of the UCCJA). See also Day v Montana Dept of So-
cial and Rehabilitation Servs, Child Support Enforcement Div, 900 P2d 296, 299 (Mont
1995) ("As regards child support orders issued in Indian tribal courts, Indian tribes are
deemed to be 'States,' 28 USC § 1738 B(b).").
126 See In re Larch, 872 F2d 66, 68 (4th Cir 1989) (holding that the Cherokee tribe is a
state for the purposes of the PKPA).
127 See Deslarlait v Desjarlait, 379 NW2d 139, 143 (Minn Ct App 1985) ("[Tlhe UCCJA
does not apply to jurisdictional disputes between a state court and a tribal court.");
Malaterre v Malaterre, 293 NW2d 139, 144 (ND 1980) (refusing to resolve a child custody
issue between a tribal court and a state court on the basis of the UCCJA because the
UCCJA involves disputes between states. The court viewed the tribe as a "dependent
sovereign or quasi sovereign").
128 See Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.23 (West 6th ed
2000).
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Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA")" 9 might demonstrate
congressional belief that the UCCJA's silence required a specific
legislative remedy.' On the other hand, a canon of construction
dictates that when ambiguity exists in statutes affecting the
rights of Indians, courts should construe those statutes in favor of
Indians. 3' Judges could decide excluding "tribes" from the statu-
tory definitions would harm Indian rights, thus construing the
provisions to include tribes.
Even if state courts adopted a uniform interpretation to give
tribal custody determinations full faith and credit under the
UCCJA, tribal courts would still have to act in accordance with
the jurisdictional mandates of that state to take advantage of its
protections. Tribal submission to state law precludes them from
exercising jurisdiction to the full extent that constitutional law
and treaties permit.'32 The UCCJA fails to even acknowledge the
sovereignty concerns inherent in tribal governance over custody
affairs, let alone meaningfully distinguish them from generic
state interests in custody litigation. Instead, the purpose of the
UCCJA is merely to help guarantee that child custody litigation
"take[s] place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his
family have the closest connection and where significant evidence
concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relation-
ships is most readily available."'33 Courts are supposed to decline
jurisdiction "when the child and his family have a closer connec-
tion with another state."'34 Thus, an Indian child who resides out-
side Indian country would not be subject to tribal jurisdiction.
In summary, the UCCJA currently presents tribes with a
Hobson's choice. Tribal courts can either protect their decisions
with full faith and credit, or they can have jurisdiction over non-
residents, but they cannot have both. The UCCJA thus fails to
accommodate tribal interests in their children, and, ultimately, in
their own survival as distinct political and ethnic groups.
129 9(IA) ULA 655 (1999).
130 See Stoner, 75 ND L Rev at 301 (cited in note 114) (contending that ambiguity
about the recognition of tribal court custody orders was one of the factors motivating the
drafting of the UCCJEA).
131 See Montana v Blackfeet Tribe, 471 US 759, 766 (1985) ("[Statutes are to be con-
strued liberally in favor of the Indians with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit."). See also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v Hollowbreast, 425 US 649, 655 n 7 (1976)
(utilizing the canon that "statutes passed for the benefit of the Indians are to be liberally
construed and all doubts are to be resolved in their favor").
132 For a discussion of the limits of tribal jurisdiction, see Parts I A and I B.
133 UCCJA § 1(a)(3),9(IA) ULA 271 (1999).
14 UCCJA § 7(b), 9(IA) ULA 498 (1999).
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B. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
In order to remedy the jurisdictional loopholes and ambigui-
ties of the UCCJA, over twenty states have enacted the
UCCJEA135 Several more state legislatures will soon debate its
enactment.1 3' The UCCJEA alters the UCCJA by "giving jurisdic-
tional priority and exclusive continuing jurisdiction to the home
state."137 This harmonizes the UCCJEA with other custody stat-
utes like the PKPA, which in turn increases the likelihood that
custody orders in compliance with the UCCJEA will receive full
faith and credit in other states. 38 If a child has not lived in a
home state for the six months prior to the custody proceedings,
the UCCJEA provides backstop mechanisms to determine juris-
diction: significant connection; more appropriate forum; and vac-
uum jurisdiction.139
The UCCJEA also specifically addresses how states should
handle custody orders granted by tribal courts. First, the
UCCJEA clearly excludes from its scope all proceedings directly
governed by the ICWA 4° Second, the statute explicitly gives the
states the option to extend the UCCJEA to Indian tribes.' If a
state enacts this provision, it must then treat tribes as sister
states.'42 This requires consenting states to enforce all tribal de-
crees arising from custody proceedings that substantially conform
to the UCCJEA requirements.' Some states have adopted the
optional tribal provision.' A few states have either rejected the
135 UCCJEA § 305, 9(IA) ULA 692-93 (1999). See Uniform Law Commissioners, Intro-
ductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts: A Few Facts About... The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, available online at <http://www.nccusl.org/
uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.htm> (visited Mar 20, 2001) [on file with the
U Chi Legal F] (listing the twenty-two states that have adopted the UCCJEA).
136 See id (listing thirteen states where legislators have introduced the UCCJEA in
2001).
137 Stoner, 75 ND L Rev at 305 (cited in note 114).
138 See id.
139 See Joan Zorza, The UCCJEA: What It Is and How Does It Affect Battered Women
in Child Custody Disputes, 27 Fordham Urban L J 909, 916-17 (2000) (discussing the
various forms ofjurisdiction under the UCCJEA).
140 See UCCJEA § 104, 9(IA) ULA 661 (1999).
141 See UCCJEA § 104(a), 9(IA) ULA 661 (1999). See also Atwood, 83 Minn L Rev at
927-28, 954-57 (cited in note 92).
142 See UCCJEA § 104(b), 9(IA) ULA 661 (1999) ("A court of this state shall treat a
tribe as if it were a State of the United States for the purpose of applying [the jurisdiction
and recognition of the Act.]").
143 UCCJEA § 104, 9(IA) ULA 661 (1999).
144 For example, both North Carolina and North Dakota have adopted the optional
provision on tribes. See Institute of Government, North Carolina Legislation 1999: Chil-
dren and Families, available online at <http://www.iog.unc.edu/pubs/nclegis/nclegis99/
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
UCCJEA wholesale, or specifically declined to enact the optional
provision that speaks to tribes and tribal decrees.'45 These states
still face the decision of whether to apply the UCCJA to tribal
courts.
Importantly, the UCCJEA does not purport to legislate cus-
tody jurisdiction for tribal courts.'46 Like states, tribes may reject
application of the UCCJEA.147 Thus, tribes once again may face a
difficult decision. While compliance with the UCCJEA guarantees
that states will grant full faith and credit to tribal decrees, it also
means that tribes cannot exercise jurisdiction beyond what the
UCCJEA permits. For example, if a child possesses meaningful
tribal ties but lives five minutes outside of the reservation, that
child would be subject to dissolution-based custody proceedings in
state court under the UCCJEA. Yet if tribes refuse to enact the
UCCJEA, tribal courts run the risk that some state courts will
decide not to enforce any tribal custody decrees. 4 ' For example, if
a child and one parent live on a reservation and the other parent
lives off the reservation, the tribe has little assurance that the
state court will respect a custody order issued by the tribal court.
Unfortunately, the UCCJEA also fails to resolve many of the
hard jurisdictional questions in relation to tribal custody decrees
not governed by ICWA. First, no clear standards govern the state
courts' determination of when tribes are in "substantial confor-
mity with the jurisdictional standards."'49 Thus under the
UCCJEA, tribes may find it difficult to demonstrate that they
Chfin04.htm> (visited Apr 4, 2001) [on file with the U Chi Legal F1 (discussing North
Carolina law); B.J. Jones, A Primer on Tribal Court Civil Practice, available online at
<http://www.court.state.nd.us/Court/Resource/Tribal.htm#N_26> (visited Apr 4, 2001) [on
file with the U Chi Legal F] (discussing North Dakota law).
14 Alaska Stat § 25.30.300 et seq (Lexis 1998); News... from the Assembly Judiciary
Committee, available online at <http://assembly.state.ny.usfUpdates/Judiciary/summ2000.
html> (visited Nov 11, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F] ( "Last year, the UCCJEA was
vetoed by the [New York] Governor despite strong support for the proposed law from bar
associations, the Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, academics and domestic violence
advocates.").
146 See UCCJEA § 104(c) & comment, 9(IA) ULA 661 (1999).
147 See B.J. Jones, A Primer on Tribal Court Civil Practice, available online at
<http://www.court.state.nd.us/Court/Resource/Tribal.htm#N-26> (visited Apr 4, 2001) [on
file with U Chi Legal F] ("[In North Dakota,] three of the tribal codes, Turtle Mountain,
Spirit Lake and Three Affiliated Tribes, have general provisions regarding the recognition
of foreign judgments. Standing Rock apparently has no provision in its code but has rec-
ognized foreign judgments if those foreign jurisdictions recognize its court orders.").
148 See Atwood, 83 Minn L Rev at 956 (cited in note 92) ("Indian tribes who do not
choose to so 'Anglicize' their tribal codes run the risk that Anglo-American courts will view
their custody decrees as lacking in legal force. The carrot of recognition is attained
through the stick of assimilation.").
149 UCCJEA § 104(c), 9(IA) ULA 661 (1999).
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exercised proper jurisdictional authority.' As a result, many
tribes with codes that grant tribal jurisdiction over any custody
proceeding when at least one parent is enrolled in the tribe and
the child is eligible for tribal membership' may feel compelled to
limit their jurisdictional reach to exactly what is allowed in the
UCCJEA.
The emphasis on the home state also suggests that the
UCCJEA overlooks some unique concerns of Indians. Many state
governments are successfully decreasing the area of land over
which Indians may govern.'52 Yet the UCCJEA fails to accommo-
date membership-based sovereignty, and instead relies purely on
geography.'53 If states and tribes bind themselves to a geographi-
cal determination of "home state" at the same time that states
actively reduce what comprises Indian "home states," adopting
the UCCJEA commits tribes to increasing future jurisdictional
losses over child custody proceedings.
Another problem arises when children split their time be-
tween homes both on and off a reservation. If there is no clear
home state, or the home state has declined jurisdiction, a state
with "significant connection jurisdiction" may adjudicate the child
custody proceedings.' Yet both a tribe and a state might possess
significant connections. No clear way to arbitrate between the
two currently exists. Evidence from the ICWA suggests that a
state court would likely choose its own state as the "state" with
the most significant contacts.'55
These issues suggest that, like the UCCJA, the premises and
provisions of the UCCJEA hold little promise of either resolving
150 See Christine M. Metteer, A Law Unto Itself- The Indian Child Welfare Act as
Inapplicable and Inappropriate to the TransraciallRace Matching Adoption Controversy,
38 Brandeis L J 47, 86 (2000) (contending that the UCCJEA undercuts the tribe's ability
to protect its cultural identity).
"I See Atwood, 83 Minn L Rev at 968 n 174 (cited in note 92) (listing a variety of tribal
code provisions that predicate jurisdiction on tribal enrollment rather than prioritizing
residence or domicile).
152 See Getches, 84 Cal L Rev at 1584 (cited in note 34) ("More damaging to tribal
sovereignty than direct abrogation of governmental authority has been the tribes' loss of
land."). See also Valencia-Weber, 27 Conn L Rev at 1281 (cited in note 54) ("Contemporary
practices of some state governments attempt to shrink Indian country-the land over
which American Indian tribes govern-as a way of divesting or voiding tribal sover-
eignty.").
153 See Atwood, 83 Minn L Rev at 957 (cited in note 92) (contending that a tribal de-
cree "based solely on tribal membership.., would not qualify for enforcement under the
act").
154 See UCCJEA § 201(a)(2)(A), 9(IA) ULA 671 (1999).
155 See Part III.
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jurisdiction in favor of tribes or accommodating meaningful tribal
sovereignty.
III. ICWA: INDIAN CHILDREN AND TRIBAL PERPETUATION
In 1978, Congress passed the ICWA to protect Indian chil-
dren from being removed from Indian reservations and placed in
non-Indian homes by the state.'56 Congress also hoped thereby to
promote the sovereignty and security of Indian tribes. 5 7 The
ICWA embodies several principles relevant to dissolution-based
custody hearings: the importance of Indian children to continued
tribal survival, the relevance of tribal adjudication to tribal sov-
ereignty, and the necessity of unbiased proceedings to the best
interests of children.55 These concerns provide reasons for state
courts to respect tribes' interests in self-perpetuation; tribes pos-
sess an interest in self-perpetuation that the people of an indi-
vidual state lack as a mere demographic entity. In short, tribes
are different and Congress recognized that by passing the ICWA.
While the ICWA itself does not govern dissolution-based proceed-
ings, its principles strengthen the foundation for an approach to
dissolution-based hearings that turns on principles of sover-
eignty.
A. Mandates
The ICWA expanded the role of tribal courts in custody pro-
ceedings in order to remedy the state courts' inadequate consid-
eration of the tribal heritage of Indian children in the course of
their best interests determination.'59 Under the ICWA, tribal
156 See Jose Monsivais, A Glimmer of Hope: A Proposal To Keep the Indian Child Wel-
fare Act of 1978 Intact, 22 Am Indian L Rev 1, 1 (1997) (contending that the ICWA "was
enacted by Congress for the purpose of assisting parents, Indian custodians, and Indian
tribes in protecting Indian children from removal and placement by state agencies and
courts, into non-Indian homes").
157 See 25 USC § 1902 (1994) ("The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of
this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability
and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal stan-
dards for the removal of Indian children from their families.").
158 See 25 USC § 1901(3) (1994) ("there is no resource that is more vital to the contin-
ued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children").
19 See 25 USC § 1901:
[Tlhe Congress finds-
(4) That an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are [sic] broken up
by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal
public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such
[2001:634
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courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over children who are resi-
dents or domiciliaries of a reservation: "An Indian tribe shall
have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody
proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled
within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdic-
tion is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law."6 °
The text exempts dissolution-based proceedings from its pur-
view.' Tribal and state courts share concurrent jurisdiction
when Indian children reside off reservations; moreover, absent
good cause, state courts must grant parental or tribal petitions
for transfer to tribal courts.'62 As a result of these jurisdictional
mandates, tribal courts adjudicate cases under the ICWA's au-
thority.163 States must accord all ICWA-based tribal custody pro-
ceedings full faith and credit.'64
B. Purposes
The ICWA attempted to remedy three interrelated problems:
the harm done to children through custody proceedings in state
court; the demographic devastation wreaked on tribes through
the widespread removal of Indian children; and the disrespect
states show for tribal sovereignty when they deny tribal adjudica-
tion of custody proceedings. The jurisdictional mandates of the
ICWA stem from the presumption that tribal courts are both gen-
erally better suited than state courts to protect the best interests
of Indian children and are more concerned with tribal survival
and sovereignty.
children are [sic] placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institu-
tions; and
(5) That the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child
custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often
failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cul-
tural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.
160 25 USC § 1911(a) (1994).
161 See Part III C.
162 See 25 USC § 1911(b) (requiring, upon petition by either parent, the transfer to
tribal court of any state court proceeding for the "foster care placement of, or termination
of parental rights to, an Indian child" not domiciled or residing on the reservation unless a
parent or the tribe objects, or the state court finds good cause to deny the transfer).
163 See Monsivais, 22 Am Indian L Rev at 34 (cited in note 156) (contending that the
ICWA provides "a much needed legal basis for those trying to preserve the culture of our
indigenous peoples").
164 See 25 USC § 1911(d) ("The United States, every State... and every Indian tribe
shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any
Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the same extent that such
entities give full faith and credit to ... any other entity.").
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First, when considering the ICWA, Congress recognized that
state courts and social workers were unwilling or unable to accu-
rately assess certain factors relevant to Indian culture when
making custody determinations. These factors include the value
of an Indian approach to child rearing; the need for continued
tribal affiliation; and the relative unimportance of high family
income."' For example, Congress noted that Indian parents often
rely on extended family members to provide supervision. What
mainstream America might perceive as abandonment and ne-
glect,'66 Indians view as a way to build family ties.167 Similarly,
many Indians employ unconventional disciplinary methods that
rely on shaming and cautionary tales rather than conventional
discipline methods.168 Social workers lack the knowledge of Indian
social, cultural and normative values necessary to accurately as-
sess whether the behavior of a child or parent is abnormal by In-
dian standards.169 Chief Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians, explained, "[m]any ... who decide the
fate of our children are at best ignorant of our cultural values,
and at worst contemptful of the Indian way."
170
Congress further acknowledged that since state judges and
social workers generally misunderstand tribal conditions and In-
dian child rearing practices, 7' they have found many tribal mem-
bers unsuitable care providers172 and have removed children from
Indian homes in instances when a tribal court would not have
165 See Establishing Standards for the Placement of Indian Children in Foster or
Adoptive Homes, to Prevent the Breakup of Indian Families and for Other Purposes, HR
Rep No 95-1386, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 7530, 7532-33
(suggesting that state courts are institutionally incapable of accounting for the best inter-
ests of Indian children).
166 See Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian
Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong, 2d Sess, 18
(1974) (quoting Mr William Byler, executive director of the AAIA) (lamenting that social
workers ignorant of Indian family life considered "leaving the child with persons outside
the nuclear family as neglect and thus grounds for terminating parental rights").
167 Id at 4 (quoting Mr William Byler, executive director of the AAIA) ("[S]tate welfare
agents may consider the children to be running wild. They assume neglect. In many cases,
it may simply be anotlier perspective on child-rearing, placing a great deal of responsibil-
ity on the child for his own behavior and, in fact, an effective way of raising children.").
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield, 490 US 30, 35 (1989), quoting
Hearings on S 1214 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 191-92 (1978).
171 See 25 USC § 1901(5) (noting that the states "have often failed to recognize the
essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing
in Indian communities and families").
172 See HR Rep No 95-1386 at 12 (cited in note 165).
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done so. 7' These off-reservation and non-Indian placements re-
duce or eliminate the children's tribal ties.'74 Unfortunately, as
the ICWA recognized, this widespread removal had devastating
effects on children. 175 Removal from Native American environ-
ments has caused children difficulty both in coping with non-
tribal living arrangements and in developing viable Indian iden-
tities. 1
76
The ICWA also recognized that tribal survival depends on
the tribe's continued contacts with child members.'77 In his ICWA
testimony, Chief Isaac made this connection very explicit: "Cul-
turally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if
our children, the only real means for the transmission of the
tribal heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes and denied
exposure to the ways of their People."7 ' Thus, if Indian children
failed to form a meaningful Indian identity, custody proceedings
would continue the tribal decimation perpetrated by colonialism,
governmental conflict, and state-sanctioned neglect.
Finally, the ICWA indicated that promoting Indian sover-
eignty militates in favor of tribes adjudicating child custody pro-
ceedings. As Chief Isaac further exhorted, "[pirobably in no area
is it more important that tribal sovereignty be respected than in
an area as socially and culturally determinative as family
relationships."1 79 Echoing this sentiment, one court contended
that "there can be no greater threat to 'essential tribal relations,'
and no greater infringement on the right of the... Crow Tribe to
govern themselves [sic] than to interfere with tribal control over
the custody of their [sic] children."8 °
173 See 25 USC § 1901(4).
174 Monsivais, 22 Am Indian L Rev at 7 (cited in note 156) ("Indian children in non-
Indian homes are not raised as Indians.").
175 See 25 USC § 1902 (1994) (stating that ICWA established minimum standards for
removing Indian children from their families in order to "protect the best interests of
Indian children").
176 See Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian
Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong, 2d Sess, 46
(1974) (statement of Joseph Westermeyer, Department of Psychiatry at the University of
Minnesota).
177 See 25 USC § 1901(3) ("[Tlhere is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children.").
178 Holyfield, 490 US at 34, quoting Hearings on S 1214 before Subcommittee on In-
dian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
95th Cong, 2d Sess 193 (1978).
179 Id.
18o See Wakefield v Little Light, 347 A2d 228, 237-38 (Md Ct App 1975).
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C. Applying ICWA to Dissolution-Based Custody Proceedings
While the ICWA governs the determination of jurisdiction in
most Indian child custody cases, it specifically exempts child cus-
tody proceedings arising from divorce.' Courts have interpreted
this exclusion to include proceedings that involve the separation
of unmarried parents as well. 2 The plain meaning of the stat-
ute,"'83 its legislative history,' and subsequent governmental
statements 8 ' all support these exemptions. ICWA's principles
play an important role in dissolution-based custody determina-
tions.
Courts have acknowledged that dissolution-based decrees are
explicitly excluded from the ICWA, but disagreement has
emerged about the relevance of ICWA's principles and purposes
to such proceedings. Relying on formalist principles, one line of
reasoning refuses to apply ICWA-based policy arguments to di-
vorce-related child custody cases. 88 Proponents of this view claim
that applying the principles of ICWA to an area that Congress
specifically excluded from the statute's purview renders the ex-
ception meaningless. Instead, courts should strive to give all leg-
islative provisions meaning when possible.'87 Thus, they argue,
the exclusion demonstrates that Congress deliberately limited
the extrapolation of ICWA's principles.'88
181 See 25 USC § 1903(1) ("Such term.., shall not include a placement based... upon
an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents.").
182 See John, 982 P2d at 747 (contending that legislative history "suggests that Con-
gress intended the divorce exception to apply to any parental custody dispute"); Walksa-
long v Mackey, 549 NW2d 384, 387 (Neb 1996) ("[Tjhe Indian Child Welfare Act is inappli-
cable to this case, as this matter involves a custody dispute between parents in which one
of the parents has physical custody of the child.").
183 John, 982 P2d at 784 ("Congress explicitly excluded from ICWA's coverage divorce
proceedings").
184 See 25 USC § 1902. A letter from then Assistant Secretary of the Interior Gerrard
stated, "We believe that custody proceedings held pursuant to a divorce decree.., should
be excepted from the definition of the term 'placement.' We believe that the protections
provided by this act are not needed in proceedings between parents." HR Rep No 95-1386
at 31 (cited in note 165).
185 See Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, § B.3(b), 44 Fed
Reg 67,584, 67,587 (1979) ("Child custody disputes arising in the context of divorce.., are
not covered by the Act so long as custody is awarded to one of the parents.").
186 See DeMent v Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F2d 510, 514 (8th Cir 1989) (holding
that ICWA did not grant exclusive tribal jurisdiction in child custody proceedings arising
from divorce); In re Custody of Sengstock, 477 NW2d 310, 312 (Wis Ct App 1991) (holding
that ICWA does not apply to intrafamily disputes).
187 See Dunn v Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 519 US 465, 472 (1997) (re-
calling the "doctrine that legislative enactments should not be construed to render their
provisions mere surplusage").
188 Catholic Social Services, Inc v C.A.A., 783 P2d 1159, 1160 (Alaska 1989):
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An opposing line of reasoning looks to the policy rationales
and assumptions of the ICWA when determining jurisdiction in
dissolution-based custody disputes. The concerns about the best
interest of children, tribal survival, and tribal sovereignty all sig-
nificantly implicate dissolution-based custody proceedings. Al-
though these courts clearly concede that ICWA does not directly
govern such cases, they deem the purposes enshrined in the legis-
lation relevant to these determinations." 9 Jurisdictional uncer-
tainty causes delays in resolving the child's placement. Parents
dissatisfied with the outcome in either state or tribal court often
petition other courts to assume jurisdiction. 9 ° Such forum shop-
ping upsets the stability of interim custodial arrangements. The
uncertainty surrounding the enforceability of tribal custody de-
crees creates a related possibility for delay.
Potential biases of state courts also directly affect children
subject to dissolution-based custody proceedings. At least two
types of discrimination may exist. State courts that systemati-
cally misunderstand Indian child rearing may be likely to grant
sole or primary custody to a non-Indian parent. Courts may also
prefer to award custody to a parent residing off a reservation
based on misperceptions of tribal culture and reservation life.191
Biases against reservation environments and in favor of non-
Indian parenting methods hurts children's self-identity and emo-
tional well-being as they lose ties to the tribes.'92 Instances of
these forms of discrimination may rise as Indians increasingly
The provisions of the Act which give tribes the right to notice of certain
proceedings and not to others, define the scope of tribal rights. The Act
strikes a balance between the sometimes conflicting interests of Indian
parents, Indian children, and their tribes. We are unable to say that the
fact that Congress stopped short of granting tribes the right to notice in
voluntary termination proceedings is fundamentally unfair.
189 Skillen, 956 P2d at 11 ("Regardless of its literal non-application to the facts before
us, we cannot ignore the fact that the ICWA 'evinces an emphatic federal policy of protect-
ing the tribal role in proceedings involving Indian children."'), quoting Atwood, 36 UCLA L
Rev at 1062 (cited in note 18); John, 982 P2d at 754 ("Although the custody dispute at the
center of this case falls outside ICWA's scope, Congress's purpose in enacting ICWA re-
veals its intent that Alaska Native villages retain their power to adjudicate child custody
disputes.").
190 See Atwood, 36 UCLA L Rev at 1052 (cited in note 18).
191 See 25 USC § 1901(5) ("States... have often failed to recognize the essential tribal
relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian
Communities and families.").
192 See Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdic-
tion, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 Iowa L Rev 585, 602 (1994) ("The hearing tes-
timony identified Euro-American cultural bias as the underlying cause of danger to Native
American families and culture.").
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marry outside of their tribes and as Indian children and their
parents often spend significant time off the reservation land.9
While one could argue that Indian parents who voluntarily
marry outside their tribe and/or decide to move off reservation
land have chosen to devalue their Indian heritage, this observa-
tion fails to recognize that many Indians move because of a lack
of land or economic opportunity rather than to distance them-
selves from the tribe.' While there may be some Indian parents
who try to game the court system by living an assimilated life on
State land but want what they perceive as the preference of tribal
courts, it is still true that state courts are systemically unattuned
to the interests of Indian children.
IV. RESOLVING DISSOLUTION-BASED CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
State legislatures, tribes, and judges must balance competing
concerns when adjudicating dissolution-based custody disputes.
The UCCJA, UCCJEA, and PKPA seek to deter child snatching
through a bright-line jurisdictional rule that favors the home
state.'95 These statutes, along with the ICWA, also attempt to
reduce the risks of delay and conflicting judgments that arise
from jurisdictional ambiguity. 9 ' The ICWA also raises separate
concerns of tribal sovereignty and tribal survival.'97 Finally, one
must also account for the best interests of children, a theme that
runs throughout family law and these jurisdictional statutes.
The following framework tries to coherently accommodate
these concerns, discussing the possible jurisdictional conflicts in
turn. In laying out the possible permutations of geography and
tribal membership, this Comment employs the non-infringement
doctrine to help resolve some of these complicated disputes. While
it is impossible to perfectly accommodate all of the relevant inter-
ests, the non-infringement doctrine provides a basis from which
193 See notes 2, 5, and 6 and accompanying text.
194 Justin P. Orr, The Dream Fulfilled = Economic Justice, Kansas City Star (Jan 14,
2001) available online at <http://www.kcstar.com/king/2001stories/korr.html>, (visited
Nov 11, 2001) [on file with the U Chi Legal F].
Many tribes exist under an excruciatingly complex system of tribal-owned, leased
and privately held land ownership, defying any organized approach to financially viable
economic development. Most capital-based interests have chosen to step around these
complexities. Today, about 70 percent of Native Americans live off reservation lands, a
direct result of the lack of economic opportunity on reservations.
195 See Part II.
196 See Parts II and III.
197 See Part III B.
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to understand the preference for sovereignty over a more rule-
bound approach or the application of the UCCJEA to tribes.
A. When All Relevant Parties Are Tribal Members Residing in
Indian Country, Tribal Jurisdiction Is Exclusive
The exclusivity of tribal jurisdiction, when all parties are
tribal members living in Indian country, is relatively uncontro-
versial. 9 ' This consensus likely arises from Fisher, which firmly
established that a tribal court exercises exclusive jurisdiction
over an adoption proceeding when all the relevant parties are
tribal members residing on a reservation. In this instance the
application of the non-infringement doctrine is easy; state in-
volvement would clearly interfere with the ability of Indians to
make and be governed by their own rules. More broadly speaking,
in the absence of an explicit grant of congressional authority to
the states, tribes maintain their sovereignty over internal af-
fairs.199 One need not determine if internal affairs require both
land and membership sovereignty or if one is sufficient, because
tribal members residing in Indian country clearly meet both cri-
teria. When tribal membership and reservation residence are co-
terminous, it seems clear that there is no state interest. Reliance
on the non-infringement doctrine and adoption of the UCCJEA
both yield the same outcome.
B. When the Child and One Parent Are Enrolled Tribal
Members and the Child Resides in Indian Country,
Tribal Jurisdiction Is Exclusive
The Montana Supreme Court recently adjudicated a case
where the child and her mother were enrolled tribal members
residing on a reservation while the father lived off the reserva-
tion. Skillen announced general guidelines to determine when
tribal courts possess exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction over
198 See In re Marriage of Wellman, 852 P2d 559, 562 (Mont 1993) (granting exclusive
tribal court jurisdiction where the state has not asserted authority under PL-280); In re
Marriage of Limpy, 636 P2d 266, 268-69 (Mont 1981) (deferring to tribal court's finding of
exclusive jurisdiction); Stewart v District Court, 609 P2d 290, 292 (Mont 1980) (abstaining
to the tribal court on comity grounds). See also Fisher, 424 US at 389 (characterizing an
adoption between tribal members who reside on a reservation as "litigation arising on the
Indian reservation"); Whyte v District Court, 346 P2d 1012, 1014-15 (Colo 1959) (holding
that state courts have no jurisdiction over divorce actions arising between tribal members
residing on the reservation).
199 See Part I B.
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dissolution-based custody cases. 2°° The court crafted a rule of ex-
clusive tribal court jurisdiction whenever a dispute arises involv-
ing an Indian child and at least one Indian parent, both of whom
reside on the reservation. The court determined that the resi-
dence and tribal affiliation of the non-custodial parent were ir-
relevant.2"1 The court's reasoning helps illuminate when relevant
sovereignty and policy concerns suggest that tribal jurisdiction
should be exclusive.
1. Non-Infringement doctrine.
In order to prevail under the non-infringement doctrine,
tribes must show that: (1) they have not been divested of general
authority by an act of Congress or a treaty; (2) the issue they
wish to regulate or adjudicate falls within internal affairs; and (3)
the case is properly characterized as arising on the reservation.2 2
Establishing the tribe's inherent sovereignty is often an easy
showing. For example, in Skillen, it was clear that Fort Peck In-
dian Tribe maintained its inherent sovereignty.2 3 This reserva-
tion is located in Montana, which chose not to unilaterally as-
sume jurisdiction under PL-280. 2°4 No other federal law clearly
preempted either state or tribal assumption of jurisdiction.2 5 In
other instances, courts may have more difficult determinations
involving the construction of treaties or congressional statutes.
Next, courts must determine whether dissolution-based cus-
tody falls within the internal affairs exception established in
Montana. The Skillen court concluded that in an adjudicatory
situation, "civil jurisdiction over all activity on Indian land is
generally presumed to rest in the tribal court."2 6 While acknowl-
edging that the dispute before it involved the interests of a non-
200 956 P2d at 18 (Mont 1998).
201 Id at 16-17:
We decline here to undermine the tribe's position as a sovereign entity
with the suggestion that merely because a resident Indian child also has
significant off-reservation contacts through his non-Indian parent, its au-
thority to exercise jurisdiction in domestic matters over its members who
reside on Indian land is put in jeopardy.
202 See Part I B.
203 956 P2d at 15.
204 See id at 6.
205 See id ("Congress has in recent years legislated in the area of child custody and
specifically Indian child custody. Those federal acts, however, do not govern these facts,
nor do they operate presumptively to preempt state authority in favor of the tribe's au-
thority... Montana has not assumed jurisdiction.., pursuant to P.L.-280.").
206 Id at 14.
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member as well as members, the court reasoned that tribal sov-
ereignty had to include a tribe's "right, within its own boundaries
and membership, to provide for the care and upbringing of its
young, a sine qua non to the preservation of its identity."2"7 Thus,
Skillen relied on the fundamental principles elucidated in
Worcester and the early Williams progeny. It determined that
state jurisdiction over custody proceedings of a child domiciled on
a reservation "presents a threat in terms of the tribe's ability to
be self-governing or to control its internal relations."2 °s
Finally, courts must decide whether to employ a notion of
sovereignty based on geography or membership in order to char-
acterize the action as arising on the reservation. The majority
and the dissent in Skillen fundamentally disagreed not only
about the background rule Williams established but also how to
interpret it in the wake of Montana and Strate. Consequently, the
judges took notably different approaches to whether the relevant
activity arose on the reservation.
The Skillen majority used a geography-based notion of sover-
eignty. Thus, to determine whether the custody litigation arises
on the reservation, the court asked whether the child and one
parent were residents on the reservation prior to the initiation of
the dissolution proceedings. The court formulated its principle for
this determination of residence establishing sovereignty in clear
terms: "State jurisdiction would threaten the tribe's political in-
tegrity and welfare, even though another party to the dispute is a
non-Indian who resides off the Reservation."2' 9
Employing a notion of sovereignty based on "membership
plus geography," the dissent argued that if one of the parents is
neither a tribal member nor a resident on a reservation, states
and tribes ought to share concurrent jurisdiction.21 In distin-
guishing Fisher, the dissent argued that the custody dispute did
not arise solely on the reservation because a non-Indian was a
party to the custody proceeding.211 Thus, the internal affairs ex-
ception to Montana no longer applied, rendering the non-
infringement doctrine irrelevant.
207 Skillen, 956 P2d at 16, quoting Application of Bertelson, 617 P2d 121, 129 (Mont
1980).
208 Skillen, 956 P2d at 7.
209 Id at 17.
210 See id at 20 (Nelson dissenting) ("The express exclusion of divorce proceedings from
the ICWA's coverage illustrates Congress's intent that state and tribal courts should share
concurrent jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings arising within a divorce
proceeding between an Indian parent and a non-Indian parent.").
211 Skillen, 956 P2d at 24 (Nelson dissenting).
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The divorce cases on which the dissent relied do not address
the unique sovereignty concerns implicated in child custody
cases. The dissent cited In re Marriage of Wellman,212 which sug-
gested that concurrent jurisdiction in a divorce action between
two reservation-based Indians does not interfere with tribal gov-
ernment.213 The dissent also relied on Wells v Wells,214 which con-
cluded that that concurrent jurisdiction exists unless the divorce
only "involves two tribal members residing on the reservation."215
Yet dissolution-based custody cases present tribal concerns dis-
tinct from those involved in divorce alone. As the Skillen majority
explained, "especially when Indian children reside on the reser-
vation, they represent the single most critical resource to the
tribe's ability to maintain its identity and to determine its future
as a self-governing entity."21 In a divorce, the tribe itself does not
face the prospect of losing contacts with a tribal member. In a
child custody dispute, however, the state court could remove the
child from the reservation or give primary custody to a non-
Indian parent.
2. The use of policy principles.
The principles enshrined in the UCCJA, the UCCJEA, and
the PKPA all support the need for exclusive jurisdiction. First,
the uniform jurisdictional statutes demonstrate that exclusive
jurisdiction deters child-snatching and avoids jurisdictional com-
petition and conflict by creating bright-line rules favoring the
home state.217 While these statutes do not clearly apply to Indi-
ans,211 the Skillen majority merely used them as evidence of the
benefits of exclusive jurisdiction, rather than as support for tribal
jurisdiction. 219 The preference for rules over standards in particu-
lar circumstances drove the decision in Skillen. The majority pre-
sented a bright-line rule for determining jurisdiction when the
child resides on the reservation, and a multi-factor, standard-
212 852 P2d 559 (Mont 1993).
213 Id at 562 ("[N]o precedent suggests ... that exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by a
state district court interferes with tribal self-government."), cited in Skillen, 956 P2d at 20
(Nelson dissenting).
214 451 NW2d 402 (SD 1989).
215 Id at 405 ("[W]ithout a proper tribal court divorce, the state court is merely exercis-
ing its own concurrent jurisdiction over the marriage of one of its domiciliaries.").
216 956 P2d at 16.
217 See Part II.
218 See id.
219 956 P2d at 8-11.
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driven inquiry to employ when the child is a non-resident.22 The
dissent preferred the use of more flexible standards in both in-
stances.2 2'
Under both exclusive and concurrent modes of jurisdiction,
courts address "the best interest of the child."2 Under the geog-
raphy-based sovereignty rule, however, a court immediately de-
cides that it is in the best interest of the child to narrow the po-
tential for jurisdictional disputes and does so in favor of the
tribe.223 Under the regime of the Skillen dissent, the court deter-
mines whether to exercise that jurisdiction and then employs the
"best interests of the child" standard.224 Yet, as one commentator
suggests, courts have used the best interests standard subjec-
tively to prevent jurisdictional transfers to tribal courts. 25 State
courts may distrust tribal courts and their placements.22 Thus,
with concurrent jurisdiction, there is a high risk of error costs.
The ICWA shows that Congress recognized that tribal sover-
eignty concerns are greater when the child resides on rather than
off the reservation. In such cases, the child's relationship with the
tribe is concrete enough to justify a application of a rule rather
than a standard.227 The legislative history of the ICWA provides
compelling evidence that: (1) state courts fail to recognize that
220 See id at 17-18.
221 See id at 28 (Nelson dissenting) ('Recognition of concurrent jurisdiction would allow
us to follow the more flexible inquiry described in Bertelson in all interparental child cus-
tody disputes involving Native American children.") (citations omitted).
222 See Jones, 73 ND L Rev at 423-24 (cited in note 1) ("State court judges have been
indoctrinated, however, to believe that every decision they make in a proceeding involving
a child must be done in the best interest of that child, and view proceedings involving
Indian children no differently.").
223 Skillen, 956 P2d at 15 ("We reiterate here that the best interests of the child should
be the predominant factor in the determination of which court should have jurisdiction in
a matter that involves an Indian child. We further assert that.., we must presume that
the tribal court has jurisdiction.").
224 Id at 23 (Nelson dissenting):
I disagree that the best interests of the child standard should be used as
the controlling principle to determine whether a court possesses subject
matter jurisdiction over a child custody case as a matter of law. Rather,
only after concluding that it possesses subject matter jurisdiction should
a court use the best interests of the child standard as a controlling prin-
ciple to determine whether to exercise that jurisdiction.
225 See Jones, 73 ND L Rev at 398 (cited in note 1) ("Courts that have adopted the best
interests standard are thus able to question the ability of tribal courts and social service
agencies to effectively provide for the best interest of Indian children, turning the Con-
gressional presumption in favor of tribal court decision-making on its head.").
226 See Carriere, 79 Iowa L Rev at 648 (cited in note 192) ("The deep distrust that state
courts feel for tribal courts sounds as the leitmotif in their examinations of good cause.").
227 See Part III.
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tribal residence is often in the best interest of children currently
residing on Indian lands; (2) tribal court determinations better
promote the best interests of Indian children; and (3) tribal courts
are able to make fair determinations.22 These determinations
that "jurisdiction is destiny" in Indian child custody cases high-
light the applicability of the "internal affairs" exception to Mon-
tana in these cases. Recognition that state courts are compara-
tively ill-suited to protect the needs of resident Indian children
shows that state court adjudication "threaten(s) or directly af-
fect(s) the tribe's political integrity, economic security, health or
welfare."229
While the ICWA clearly excludes dissolution-based custody
proceedings, applying the ICWA's principles to jurisdictional de-
terminations adapts the principles of the ICWA to today's
changed circumstances. The concerns about tribal sovereignty
and tribal contacts for children of divorce mirror the concerns of
the ICWA. The dissent in Skillen argued that the dissolution-
based exclusion "illustrates Congress' intent that state and tribal
courts should share concurrent jurisdiction over Indian child cus-
tody proceedings arising within a divorce proceeding between an
Indian parent and a non-Indian parent."23 ° The sparse legislative
history on the exception, however, merely evidences a congres-
sional belief that children subject to divorces would not be re-
moved from both parents and placed into an unfamiliar non-
native home.23' Marriage outside the tribe and the geographical
diminishment of Indian country currently present the same
threat to tribal sovereignty and survival that adoption and foster
care once did.
Moreover, even if the exclusion is a purposeful one, courts are
still the proper actors to define the contours of sovereignty.23 2
While the uniform jurisdictional statutes suggest the benefits of
228 See id.
229 Montana, 490 US at 566.
230 Skillen, 956 P2d at 20 (Nelson dissenting).
231 HR Rep No 95-1386 at 31 (cited in note 165) (letter from Assistant Secretary of the
Interior, Forrest J. Gerrard) ("We believe that custody proceedings held pursuant to a
divorce decree.., should be excepted from the definition of the term 'placement.' We be-
lieve that the protections provided by this act are not needed in proceedings between par-
ents.").
232 See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L J 1, 7 (1999) ('[ln
these cases the congressional intent is unstated ... the outcomes turn on judicial pre-
sumption ... concerning the question whether tribes are sovereigns or merely member-
ship organizations. Thus, it is the Court, not Congress, that has exercised front-line re-
sponsibility for the vast erosion of tribal sovereignty.").
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exclusive jurisdiction, and the ICWA demonstrates the need for
tribal jurisdiction, the non-infringement doctrine alone is enough
to dictate exclusive tribal jurisdiction.233 Finally, because both
uniform jurisdictional statutes and the non-infringement doctrine
are geography-based approaches, they both would support exclu-
sive tribal jurisdiction when the child resides on a reservation.
3. Objections to exclusive jurisdiction.
Possible objections might be made to exclusive tribal jurisdic-
tion when a parent is not a tribal member or does not reside on a
reservation. First, when the ICWA was enacted, some objected
that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction constituted a violation of
the equal protection rights of non-Indians. They argued that sub-
jecting non-Indians to automatic tribal court jurisdiction is a pol-
icy of race discrimination in favor of Indians. Yet, the Court has
indicated that favoring tribal jurisdiction is not impermissible
racial discrimination.21 4 Even if one of the parents is not eligible
for tribal membership, the tribal court may constitutionally exer-
cise jurisdiction. Fisher makes this clear in stating, "[tihe exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the race
of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign status of the
Northern Cheyenne Tribes under federal law."235 In this instance,
the membership of the child triggers recognition of the tribe's
sovereign interest; the state does not make a racial classification.
Moreover, the imposition on the non-Indian parent is justi-
fied based on the individual's consensual familial relations with a
tribal member. As Barbara Atwood compellingly argues, "by par-
enting a child with a tribal member, the non-Indian should be on
notice that the tribe may ultimately assert its inherent authority
over the resulting family."236 While one could argue that, con-
versely, the Indian ought to be on notice that the state could as-
sert its jurisdiction, the location of the child's residence ought to
be an obvious possible source of jurisdiction.
As for the jurisdictionally-relevant ties between the non-
tribal parent and the reservation, personal jurisdiction is no
longer a prerequisite to judicial action in many child custody pro-
233 See Part I C.
234 United States v Antelope, 430 US 641, 646 (1977) ("[F]ederal regulation of Indian
affairs is not based upon impermissible classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in
the unique status of Indians as 'a separate people' with their own political institutions.").
235 424 US at 390-91.
236 Atwood, 36 UCLA L Rev at 1105 (cited in note 18).
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ceedings. While it is beyond the scope of this Comment to fully
address the power to compel the non-tribal parent to comply with
such orders if he or she has no minimum contacts with the reser-
vation, "the clear consensus today is that personal jurisdiction
over the absent parent is not essential to a court's power to issue
a binding decree in child custody cases." '237 Many scholars argue
that in child custody cases, personal jurisdiction over parents is
simply irrelevant."8 Even if personal jurisdiction were a signifi-
cant consideration, it seems likely that the non-resident parent
would have substantial connections with the reservation if the
child resides or is domiciled on it. While these contacts will not
always be sufficient, personal jurisdiction would probably prevent
the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction in only a handful of cases at
best.
C. When the Child Is an Enrolled Tribal Member Not Residing
in Indian Country, Tribal and State Jurisdiction
Are Concurrent
The UCCJEA and the geography-plus interpretation of sov-
ereignty differ in how they treat children residing off reserva-
tions. Under the UCCJEA, if a home state can be established, it
is determinative for purposes of jurisdiction."9 Thus, if a child
resides in an Indian community but not on Indian land, state
courts have jurisdiction over dissolution-based custody hearings.
Yet under geography-plus based sovereignty, states and tribal
courts share concurrent jurisdiction over a non-resident child.
While concurrent jurisdiction is subject to problems of bias, sub-
jective inquiries, and potential jurisdictional competition, its
flexible approach to overlapping concerns of sovereignty presents
the better solution to assigning jurisdiction.
237 Id at 1065-66 & n 65.
238 See, for example, Anthony A. Dorland, Note, Civil Procedure-Orders for Child
Protection and Nonresident Defendants: The UCCJA Applies and Minimum Contacts Are
Unnecessary, 25 Wm Mitchell L Rev 965, 976 (1999) (arguing that the UCCJA provides a
clear exception to personal jurisdiction); Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 1995 U Ill L Rev 813, 815 ("[The State] can adjudicate child custody
disputes as long as it is the child's 'home state,' regardless of whether the child or either
parent is domiciled there or whether it has in personam jurisdiction over the parents.")
(citations omitted).
239 See Part II B.
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1. Sovereignty interest.
While tribal sovereignty may be implicated most strongly by
matters arising in Indian country that involve tribal members,
many of the concerns that drive the non-infringement doctrine
are present in off-reservation custody disputes as well. If one ac-
cepts the geography-plus notion of sovereignty over approaches
that focus solely on geography or membership, tribal court juris-
diction exists independently of territory.2 40 This jurisdiction is
limited to instances that affect tribal authority and the right to
self-government.241
The relevance of this variable opens the objection that even if
one of the parents is not a tribal member, under the geography-
plus model, the membership of the child remains relevant to de-
termining jurisdiction.2 42 If the custody proceeding does not arise
in Indian country, then the dispute does not interfere with the
tribe's internal affairs or self government.2 43 Both the John court
and the ICWA support the focus on the membership of the child
in determining jurisdiction.244 Moreover, as explained above, per-
sonal jurisdiction is not required in child custody disputes.2 45 Be-
cause the residence of the parents is not determinative and be-
cause custody disputes may affect the internal affairs of a tribe,
tribal courts should have jurisdiction.
Unlike cases where the child resides on the reservation, in
these instances the state also has a substantial interest in the
best interests of the child. Federal law indicates that the only
barrier to state jurisdiction over Indians and their affairs is In-
dian country.2 46 Thus, the mere establishment of a tribe's sover-
eign interest does not dictate exclusive jurisdiction. Policy consid-
erations help resolve jurisdictional disputes between competing
sovereigns.
240 See John, 982 P2d at 752 ("The [Supreme] Court has not focused on tribal court as
determinative of tribal sovereignty.").
241 See Part I B.
242 See John, 982 P2d at 759 ("A tribe's inherent sovereignty to adjudicate internal
domestic custody matters depends on the membership ... of the child. Such a focus on the
tribal affiliation of the children is consistent with federal statutes such as ICWA.").
243 See id at 780 (Matthews dissenting) ("The United States Supreme Court has never
held.., that a tribe's inherent sovereignty, in and of itself, independent of Indian country,
can be the basis for tribal adjudicatory authority.") (citations omitted).
244 See Part I A.
245 See Part IV B 3.
246 See John, 982 P2d at 759 ("[Flederal law suggests that the only bar to state juris-
diction over Indians and Indian affairs is the presence of Indian country."), citing Mesca-
lero Apache Tribe v Jones, 411 US 145, 148-49 (1973).
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2. Policy principles.
The concern for the best interest of the child, the importance
of tribal ties to children, and the potential of state court bias sup-
port a measured presumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction.247 In
similar non-dissolution based custody cases, the ICWA supports
concurrent jurisdiction and focuses on membership and tribal ties
in non-resident cases. The rationales underlying the ICWA apply
here: Indian children whose tribal ties are reduced or eliminated
as a result of divorce implicate tribal survival in ways similar to
off-reservation adoption and foster care placements governed by
the ICWA. Similarly, state court bias or misperceptions regarding
Indian practices of child rearing may undermine their ability to
accurately assess the best interests of the child.
Under a comity-based approach, neither tribes nor states
have to transfer jurisdiction but both may do so as they see fit.
The factors developed in Application of Bertelson"4 -which in-
clude the child's ethnic and cultural identity, relevant tribal cus-
toms, and the child's relationship with both parents and with the
tribe249-guide state and tribal courts trying to assign jurisdiction
based on the child's best interests.25 ° Thus, state courts would
likely assert jurisdiction over a child who possesses no contacts to
the tribe and is wholly assimilated into non-Indian society, and
would likely transfer jurisdiction over a child who is an active
member of an Indian community.
Of course, there are still hard cases where the Bertelson fac-
tors fail to conclusively favor a particular court. Comity-based
247 See Atwood, 83 Minn L Rev at 966 (cited in note 92):
A tribal court's consideration of culture and tradition in its judicial deci-
sion making may make state courts reluctant to respect the tribal court's
ruling where non-Indian interests are at stake. Anglo-American judges,
who can often misunderstand the meaning of tribal identity, may fear
that the foreign concept of tribalism will override the best interests of the
child.
248 617 P2d 121 (Mont 1980).
249 See id at 130.
250 Several cases suggest that states and tribal courts share concurrent jurisdiction
over Indian children when the children reside off the reservation. See John, 982 P2d at
765 ("Tribal courts in Alaska have jurisdiction to adjudicate custody disputes involving
tribal members. This jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the state courts."); Skillen, 956
P2d at 18 ("[W]e hold that when an Indian child resides off the reservation, the state court
and tribal court share concurrent jurisdiction."); Bertelson, 617 P2d at 129-30 ("[Tlo prop-
erly consider tribal interests in child custody that go beyond reservation boundaries, the
best means to arrive at a considered decision as to whether a state court should accept or
decline jurisdiction is to balance the state interests in taking jurisdiction against the tribal
interest in assuming jurisdiction.").
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deference sacrifices the clarity of geography-only rules and opens
the door for possibly harmful judicial discretion. Under the
UCCJEA, once state or tribal courts determine the child's resi-
dence, the judicial inquiry is over. Comity-based deference re-
quires judges to engage in a much more subjective inquiry about
the child's relationship with each parent, the tribe, Indian cul-
ture, and the reservation. Some courts, mistrustful of the other
judicial system or of the other culture, may abuse these factors to
maintain jurisdiction. On balance, however, this seems preferable
to mandating a geography-only approach which is totally insensi-
tive to the concerns outlined in the ICWA and Bertelson and
when the residence of a child outside of Indian country may be
especially uninformative. That residence decision might be a re-
sult of continued federal government diminishment of Indian
country rather than a decision to distance the child from tribal
authority.25' While not all decisions to move off reservation land
are the result of explicit federal action, it is certainly not clear
that moving off the reservation is evidence of a desire to distance
oneself and one's child from the tribe's jurisdictional reach and
cultural influence.
D. Relinquishment of Tribal Authority: State Jurisdiction
Is Exclusive
If an Indian tribe has been divested of its sovereign author-
ity, either by consent or by PL-280, state courts should have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over dissolution-based proceedings. While it is
beyond the scope of this Comment to explore whether PL-280 is
properly interpreted as a divestiture statute, if a tribe is properly
divested by statute, then state courts must exercise exclusive ju-
risdiction.21 2 This outcome coheres well with the non-infringement
doctrine. If the exercise of jurisdiction stems from the tribe's sov-
ereign authority, once the tribe loses sovereignty, it should lose
adjudicatory powers as well.
Similarly, if the tribal code explicitly precludes exercising
jurisdiction, then states possess exclusive jurisdiction. Many
tribes have tried to adapt their tribal codes, either to conform
251 For a general discussion of the federal diminishment of criminal and civil jurisdic-
tion of Indian tribes, see Thorington, 31 McGeorge L Rev at 977-1042, 987 (cited in note 4)
("In addition to cutbacks in federal funding, recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate
a shift away from acknowledging any existing inherent tribal sovereignty.").
252 See discussion in Part I D.
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with the UCCJA253 or to limit jurisdiction to cases involving only
tribal members residing on the reservation. 254 This reluctance to
assert civil jurisdiction is not constitutionally mandated, 5 and
these tribes could change their codes to assert jurisdiction if they
so desired.
CONCLUSION
Dissolution-based child custody cases provide state courts
and legislatures with an opportunity to respect tribal sovereignty
through recognition of tribal court jurisdiction. State legislatures
and individual tribes should decline to enact the optional provi-
sion of the UCCJEA which extends its mandates to cases involv-
ing Indian children. Instead, state courts should be left to apply
the non-infringement doctrine in dissolution-based cases. While
the non-infringement doctrine will not always result in tribal
court jurisdiction, it provides a principled way to balance the in-
terests of children, parents, tribes, and states.
253 See Atwood, 83 Minn L Rev at 974 (cited in note 92) ("In a few tribes, the process of
assimilation is evident in the formal laws governing child custody jurisdiction. In these
tribes, the family codes have been drafted to reflect the prevailing jurisdictional model.").
254 Id at 973 ("Several tribal codes include a geographic tie to the reservation by a
parent or child as a prerequisite to the exercise of custody jurisdiction.").
255 See Parts I A and I B.
652
